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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRLENE RAE TURNER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THOMAS DE LAN TURNER, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant and Respondent. ) 
Case No. 17257 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
-1-
---------------------------------------~-----------------------------------
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for divorce not involving children, in which 
questions of property distribution, alimony and attorney fees are 
presented to the Court for consideration. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Trial on the issues was had on the 21st day of May, 1980, and 
following additional argument and motions, the Court entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment on the 3rd 
day of July, 1980. The Decree granted the divorce to the plaintiff, 
provided for certain support, division of property and attorney fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks amendment of the trial court's determination 
as to property distribution, alimony, and attorney fees, and an Order 
from the Court remanding the case to the District Court for revision 
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with respect to all of such items in conformance with the Order 
of the Court, with a requested Order of the Supreme Court directing 
that the property acquired by the parties during the marriage be 
distributed in approximately one-half value to the plaintiff and 
one-half value to the defendant; ordering that the plaintiff be 
granted additional amounts for alimony, and for attorney fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For simplicity in reference, the titles "Plaintiff" and 
"Defendant" will be used herein. 
The plaintiff and the defendant were inter-married at 
San Leandro, California on the 26th day of June, 1971. Each of the 
parties had been previously divorced from other spouses. T. 32-24. 
The plaintiff brought into the marriage, household furnishings and 
fixtures, and a vehicle acquired from her first marriage; the 
defendant lost most of his property to his prior wife, T. 33-4, 
but did have household furnishings and fixtures, some savings, 
interest in real estate, interest in hie mother's estate, and work 
tools, having a value based upon defendant's testimony, of approximatel1 
$23,000. At the time of their marriage, each of the parties were 
employed, with the plaintiff working at the Bank of America, and the 
defendant working as an officer for the Oakland City Police Department 
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Just several weeks prior to their marriage, the parties acquired 
a house, and the down payment was made from the defendant's funds. 
As the parties entered into the marriage, the plaintiff brought her 
minor child, who was approximately 9 years of age at the time. 
The defendant did not have children which he brought into the 
marriage, and the parties to this action did not have children during 
the course of their marriage. 
From the time of their marriage, the parties pooled their 
mutual assets and also pooled their earnings. Their mutual goal was 
to acquire sufficient cash assets so that they could move to Utah and 
acquire farm property and locate themselves here. T. 49-17. This 
goal was eventually consummated and the parties began to purchase 
real estate in Utah in 1974, and continued to purchase several years 
thereafter, eventually acquiring in Utah, property generally described 
as the Malmgren home, Horton home, Christensen farm, and Bendixen farm. 
A complete analysis of the assets acquired by the parties during their 
marriage was submitted to the Court, and is found at Page 31 of the 
record. Based upon that analysis, the parties paid for the assets 
acquired $111,929.00, and these assets had a net value at the time 
of the divorce proceedings of $190,700.00. T. 8-11. During the 
marriage the parties had acquired from the wages of each, together 
with certain pension benefits and sales of property, and loans, total 
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disposable income in the sum of $290,949.00. The values for the 
property as specified by the plaintiff were determined by consultation 
with her attorney and by using the multiple listing catalog provided 
by the Real Estate Association serving the Juab County area, where 
the parties' property is located. T. 11-16. Further, by using 
depreciation tax schedules, and based upon joint values and values 
placed upon the property by the defendant. T. 12-12, T. 13-19, T. 14-c' 
T. 23-18, T. 51-29. 
As the property was acquired it was acquired by the jointly 
pooled money of the parties, and the property was placed in their 
joint names. T. 54-25, R. 87. 
During the time of their marriage, the defendant continued his 
employment at the Oakland City Police Department, even past a retirement: 
point, so as to qualify his wife for certain pension benefits. T. SS·li 
However, these pension benefits, in so far as the plaintiff is concernel, 
terminated at the divorce, but the defendant continued to receive the 
benefits as established by the marriage. R. 89. Further, the 
pension benefits acquired by the plaintiff through her employment, 
were terminated through the property investments by reason of her 
withdrawing of those pension funds and withdrawing from her work with 
Bank of America. R. 89. 
As the parties acquired their Utah property, they then made plan! 
to move to Utah and eventually did so; and with the move from Californi• 
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to Utah the plaintiff tenninated her employment outside the family 
business, and stayed in Utah, worked on the farm, managed the family 
home and functioned as the manager of the family business. R. 88, 
T. 64-11. The defendant, on the other hand, secured employment as an 
iron worker with Kennecott Copper, working in the Huntington, Utah 
area, and worked as an instructor at Snow College, and at the time of 
the divorce was working essentially with the farm. At the time of 
the divorce the plaintiff was employed as a receptionist at a local 
medical clinic. 
The Court found that the plaintiff was entitled to a divorce 
from the defendant on grounds of mental cruelty, there being evidence 
introduced that there were numerous arguments between the parties; 
that the defendant often resorted to threatening divorce action and 
that finally he transferred hie affections from the plaintiff to another 
woman; that he presented himself in public with a woman other than the 
plaintiff, and even went to the Clinic where the plaintiff was employed 
in the company of his lady friend, and there secured blood tests for 
a marriage contemplated in the future. And that the same was humiliating 
to the plaintiff. T. 4-27, T. 6-26, T. 8-5. 
At the time of the divorce the defendant's income consisted of 
cash coming from hie pension with the Oakland City Police Department, 
which brought a net income of $923 per month; in addition to that,he 
had whatever income he was able to derive from the farm, but the 
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defendant refused to testify as to same, but did indicate that his 
health was sufficient to allow him to continue his farming operation, 
T. 73-21. T. 74-17. The plaintiff testified that she was employed 
at the medical clinic in Nephi, Utah where her net monthly income was 
approximately $540. The plaintiff testified that her present monthly 
expenses were $763, and would shortly increase to approximately $WOO 
per month. T. 26-20, R. 38. And based upon such analysis, she had an 
iunnediate need of $225 per month alimony, and that amount would increas, 
in the year of 1981 to approximately $500 per month. Based upon the 
financial analysis of earnings during the marriage, R. 34, the parties 
. I had in addition to the monies spent for the purchase of their property,! 
disposable income of approximately $20,000 per year. T. 21-16, R. 36. 
It was upon this income that the plaintiff's standard of living was 
established. 
There was undisputed testimony that the reasonable attorney fees 
for the efforts of plaintiff's attorney, was the sum of $1500. T. 87-11,: 
and the Court so found, R. 90. 
With this factual background, the Court distributed the property 
according to the values placed thereon by the plaintiff, so as to give 
to the plaintiff a net distribution of $52 ,642 .00, and to the defendant 
a net distribution of $146 ,050 .00; or, 27% of the assets to the plaintili 
and 73% of the assets to the defendant. Or on the other hand, based upo: 
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the values placed upon the property by the defendant, the plaintiff 
received a net distribution of $60,274.00, and the defendant received 
a net distribution of $115 ,850.00; or, 33% to the plaintiff and 
67% to the defendant. 
The Court granted the plaintiff alimony in the sum of $50 per 
month, for 24 consecutive months. And the Court granted the plaintiff 
judgment against the defendant for reasonable attorney fees in the sum 
of $500. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. A MARITAL ESTATE SHOULD ·BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES WHERE EACH PARTY HAS CONTRIBUTED SIMILAR TIME AND 
EFFORT TO THE ACCUMULATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE PROPERTY 
WHICH IS ACQUIRED IN THEIR JOINT NAMES. 
The authority of a trial court to dispose of property in a 
divorce proceeding is specified statutorily in U.C.A. 1953 
Section 30-3-5(1): 
When a decree of divorce is made, the court may 
make such orders in relation to the children, 
property and parties, and the maintenance of the 
parties and children, as may be equitable. The 
court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders with respect to 
the support and maintenance of the parties, the 
custody of the children and their support and 
maintenance, or the distribution of property as 
shall be reasonable and necessary ... 
The requirement that court orders concerning property disposition 
be equitable was likewise contained in earlier statutes. 
Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Section 3000; U.C.A. 1943 Section 40-3-5. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has been quite consistent through the 
years in its pronouncements concerning property distribution in 
divorce cases. In almost all its opinions discussing the i8sue on 
appeal, the Court has variously noted that the trial judge has 
considerable latitute of discretion in the matter. Naylor v. Naylor, 
563 P.2d 184 (Utah 1977). This means that even though the trial 
court's judgment may be reviewed on appeal, it will not be disturbed 
"unless the evidence clearly preponderates against the finding of the 
trial court; or there has been a plain abuse of discretion; or where 
a manifest injustice or inequity is wrought." MacDonald v. MacDonald, 
120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951). 
The Supreme Court has gone further to provide guidelines 
regarding the trial court's discretion. Several opinions focus 
generally on the equity that the trial court should seek in its judgm<r: 
ri\J court's duty is ... to arrange the best possible 
allocation of the property and the economic resources of 
the parties so that the parties and their children can 
pursue their lives in as happy and useful a manner as 
possible. If it appears that the decree is so discordant 
with an equitable allocation that it will likely lead to 
further difficulties and distress than to serve the desired 
objective, then a reappraisal of the decree must be undertaken. 
(Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871, 872 (Utah 1979)) 
The responsibility of the trial court is to endeavor to 
provide a just and equitable adjustment of their economic 
resources so that the parties might reconstruct their lives 
on a happy and useful basis. (Grannne v. Grannne, 587 P.2d 
144, 148 (Utah 1978), rehearing denied (1979)) 
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These seem to be statements of the policy seen behind U.C.A. 
1953 30-3-5( 1). 
Although the Court has dealt often with divorce cases and 
property distribution, it has recently reaffirmed that, "in the 
distribution of the marital estate, there is no fixed rule or 
formula." Gramme v. Gramme, supra, at 148. This does not mean 
that the trial court's discretion is unlimited, because the Court 
has often listed factors a court might consider when they are 
pertinent to the case being tried. The most inclusive listing of 
such factors was made by (then) Mr. Justice Crockett in MacDonald v. 
MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951). Because most of the 
factors suggested in other cases are included in that list, it is 
duplicated here for the sake of convenience: 
The first six relate to conditions existing at the time of the 
marriage. 
(1) The social position and standard of living of each before 
marriage. 
(2) The respective ages of the parties. 
(3) What each may have given up for the marriage. 
(4) What money or property each brought into the marriage. 
(5) The physical and mental health of the parties. 
(6) The relative ability, training, and education of the parties. 
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The rest are conditions to be appraised at the time of the divorce. 
(7) The time of duration of the marriage. 
(8) The present income of the parties and the property acquired 
during marriage and owned either jointly or by each now. 
(9) How it was acquired and the efforts of each in doing so. 
(10) Children reared, their present ages, and obligations to them 
or help which may in some instances be expected. 
(11) The present mental and physical health of the parties. 
(12) The present age and life expectancy of the parties. 
(13) The happiness and pleasure or lack of it, experienced during 
the marriage. 
(14) Any extraordinary sacrifice, devotion or care which may have 
been given to the spouse or others, such as mother, father, etc., 
and obligations to other dependents having a secondary right to 
support. 
(15) The present standards of living and needs of each including 
the cost of living. 
In addition to this list of factors, brief mention should be 
made of a "rule of thumb" some courts have occasionally resorted to, 
namely that, in dividing the marital estate, one-third thereof 
should go to the wife and two-thirds to the husband. This concept 
apparently has its basis in an early Utah Supreme Court opinion that 
compares the dissolution of marriage by divorce to dissolution of 
marriage by death, in which case the conunon law would require that 
the widow receive one-third of her husband's estate. Griffin v. Gi:i!.0 
18 Utah 98, 55 P. 84(1898) The Court noted, however, that the amount 
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awarded should be varied "in view of the particular facts and 
circumstances." This qualification seems to undo whatever value 
the one-third/two-thirds meas~re has, unless it is merely to serve 
as a starting point from which to make variations in light of all 
the circumstances in the case. In 1927 the Court emphasized in 
discussing this standard that "no general rule can govern all cases, 
but . . . the property disposition must be varied with the peculiar 
circumstances of the case.'' Bullen v. Bullen, 71 Utah 63, 262 P. 292 
(1927), modified (1928). The Court illustrated this point by referring 
to various cases in which the property distribution was far from being 
in accordance with the one-third/two-thirds standard and yet was 
upheld on appeal. In 1975 the Supreme Court approved a judgment that 
apparently had been based on this standard, but its approval was not of 
the standard itself but of the fact that in that case its application 
was not an abuse of discretion under the circumstances. Cox v. Cox, 
532 P.2d 994(1975). And in 1977 the Court stated that a wife in a 
divorce case seeking one-third of her spouse's estate has a claim based 
only on custom, not law; that there is no formula fixing an award of 
one-third of the estate; and that the real focus is on the statutory 
requirement that orders in relation to property distribution be 
equitable. Clearly, there is nothing in this analysis to encorage a 
court to adhere strictly to the one-third/two-thirds measure. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.. 
-12-
It is difficult in analyzing Utah Supreme Court opinions in 
divorce cases to discover any pattern of approval or disapproval 
concerning property distribution made by trial courts. Indeed, the 
Court itself was motivated at one time to declare that "since each 
case goes off on its own facts, not much profit is gained by discussiL 
them." Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265 (1937) On the 
other hand, the Court in Watte v. Watts, 21 Utah 2d 137, 442 P.2d JO 
( 1968) said that even though the facts of that case were not identical 
to those in Slaughter v. Slaughter, 18 Utah 2d 274, 421 P.2d 503 (!%!, 
I 
the situation was generally similar and the same principles and 
authorities noted in that case were equally applicable to Watts. 
Therefore, because the analysis of past case law may prove to be 
persuasive here by analogy or distinction, several cases are briefly 
analyzed below in chronological order. Focus is on the property 
distribution only. 
--Stewart v. Stewart, 66 Utah 366, 242 P. 947 (1926) 
H sued W for an assault. H was awarded the house and real 
estate, jointly owned. W was awarded the household goods and $250 car 
This distribution was found inequitable and unfair and was modified, 
W to receive the household goods and one-half of the interest in t~ 
real estate with the house (no $250 cash). Analogous: ( 1) Second 
marriage for both parties. (2) No children. (3) Married ten year!· 
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(4) Ownership of property as tenants in common. (5) W contributed 
to prop~rty accumulation. Distinguishable: (1) W brought property 
into the marriage. (2) H contributed little, but made house payments 
from l1is small salary because convenient. (3) H ten years older than 
W, but W had rheumatism (affecting earning capacity of both). 
--Weaver v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166, 442 P.2d 928 (1968) 
W sued H. W was awarded about half of $750,000 estate. 
No abuse of discretion found. Analogous: (1) W assisted in supporting 
family during early years of marriage; worked five years as nurse; 
quit when first child was born and then assisted somewhat in H's medical 
practice. Distinguishable: (1) Married thirty-three years. (2) In 
addition to the $250 ,000 H accumulated by medical practice, $500,000 
was accumulated by growth in value of stocks, a considerable portion of 
which were purchased from or received as a gift from !l's father and 
sister. (3) Both had serious ailments; W totally disabled. (4) Had 
three children, now all adults. 
--Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 P.2d 193 (Utah 1974) 
W sued H. W was awarded an equal division of proceeds on the 
sale of their home, after liens and other judgments against the parties 
were satisfied. Abuse of discretion implied in Supreme Court's decision 
to modify the judgment to reimburse W for the $3,400 down payment she 
had made on the house, her claim being preferred over the other liens 
and judgments. Analogous: (1) Second marriage for both. (2) Married 
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(1) Had one five-year old child. 
--Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (1977) 
W sued H. Each awarded a one-half interest in real estate th,, 
owned. No background discussion, but no abuse of discretion found 
in dividing the proceeds equally. 
Given the above law and case rulings, it can be reasonaly arg,,: 
in the present case that the trial court abused its discretion a~ 
the presently ordered property distribution is inequitable and violat" 
the intent of statutory and case law. 
The property acquired by the parties was all acquired during t'·· 
marriage, title was taken in their joint names, consideration was pai: 
from funds acquired during the marriage from the equal effort and ti• 
of the parties, the property was acquired as a mutually determined g~t' 
and dream. And the joint effort required to acquire and manage the 
property, plus the mutual dis location of the parties from prior jobs, 
home, and society, generally led to the disintegration of the marriar 
The parties essentially entered the marriage on equal footing, 
put forth equal effort into the marraige and property accumulation, 
and consequently, should leave the marraige with an approximate equal 
distribution of property. 
The present court order divides the property anywhere from onl1 
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27% to 33% for the plaintiff, and from 67% to 73% to the defendant. 
This is clearly inequitable and requires adjustment. 
POINT I I. ALIMONY SHOULD BE BASED UPON THE NEED OF THE RECIPIENT 
AND THE ABILITY OF THE PARTIES TO EARN INCOME; AND FURTHER, 
BASED UPON THE STANDARD OF LIVING TO WHICH THEY HAVE BECOME 
ACCUSTOMED. 
Again we are faced with the determination of what is reasonable 
alimony. In making this determination the following facts are important: 
1. The standard of living had by the parties during their 
marriage was based upon disposable income, over and above that used to 
acquire their property, of approximately $20,000 per year. 
2. The plaintiff is an able bodied woman, employed as a receptionist 
with take-home pay of $540 per month, and has no other sources of income. 
3. The plaintiff's monthly budget requires expenditure of $763 
to the fall of 1981 when it will increase to $1000 per month. 
4. The plaintiff is the sole provider for a teenage son. 
5. The plaintiff terminated all earned pension benefits in order 
to acquire the property of the parties and move to Utah. 
6. The defendant is able bodied sufficient to do farm work full 
time, and has job skills as a law enforcement officer and as an iron 
worker. 
7. The defendant has income from pension benefits of $930 net each 
month, with such sum increasing by cost of living adjustments. 
Historically, the defendant has been employed and has had substantial 
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earnings from his employment, averaging over $12,000 per year during 
the marriage of the parties. And in addition has been awarded substant. 
income-producing farm property. 
8. There was no testimoney given regarding defendant's monthly 
budget, however, we do have facts which show the home he 1 i ves in, his 
farms, and machinery have been fully paid for. 
9. The defendant has no dependants. 
10. An award of temporary alimony of $300 per month was made bytl· 
court. And the defendant, consistently, without hardship, paid in 
excess of $200 per month on such order. 
Considering all of the above, it can be fairly concluded that th; 
plaintiff has a need of alimony of no less than $200 per month, and th1 
defendant has reasonable and adequate ability to pay the same. Conseqcd 
such an award would fall within the reasonable guide line of the 
applicable statute, U .C.A. 1953 Section 30-3-5( 1) And is also support•: 
by case law, see English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977). 
Consequently, the trial court's award of alimony in the sum of 
$50 per month for 24 months is inadequate, placing the plaintiff in 
necessitous circuD1Btances, while leaving the defendant with substantial:' 
more income than is required to maintain his accustomed living standarl 
This is not equitable and must now be remedied by ruling of this court. 
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POINT III. AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE BASED UPON REASONABLE 
EFFORT EXPENDED AND A REASONABLE HOURLY CHARGE. 
The awarding of attorney fees in divorce actions is statutorily 
founded in Section 30-3-3, U.C.A. 1953. And has been implimented 
and adopted by the courts, which set as guidelines: 
1. Necessity of party requesting. 
2. Granting and amount is within trial court's sound 
discretion. 
See Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 1005 (1947). 
The plaintiff had need for attorney fees. Her income of $540 per 
month plus the court ordered alimony of $50 per month, do not cover 
her undisputed expenses which are in excess of $760 per month. 
The defendant has ability to pay. With pension income in excess 
of $900 per month, plus earnings from the farm and other employment 
to which he can devote substantial time. 
There was no dispute and the court found that considering the time 
reasonably devoted to his client's cause and a reasonable hourly charge, 
plaintiff had incurred attorney fees in the sum of $1540.00. 
The effort of counsel greatly assisted the court, and the Court 
so commented: 
"You did a good job, incidentally. I appreciate that very 
much. And as a matter of fact, without those Schedules and 
without your submission on the farm property and whatever, 
I would not have been able to have understood what the testimony 
was all about." T. 93. 
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